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Ambivalent Germany. How to deal with Migration, 
Muslims, and Democracy? 
Naika Foroutan 
Abstract 
In Germany the recognition to be a country of Immigration only happened in 2001 – 
nearly 50 years after the first immigration contracts with the so called guest workers 
were signed in 19551. This recognition act sets the setting stone for a legal and political 
empowerment of migrant minorities. These communities have used the legalizing 
process to put forward their demands for political, social and cultural rights to which 
society responds in multiple ways. The responses oscillate between new alliances and 
antagonistic opposition toward immigration. Within this ambivalent society, anti-
immigration debates mainly center on Muslims as a target group that is perceived to 
boycott integration. But anti-muslim attitudes are not only reserved for right wing 
populists. Due to the omnipresence of the debates they trickle down into the middle of 
the society and reinforce ambivalences. On one side we can observe a cognitive 
recognition of privileges such as religious rights as abstract democratic values. On the 
other hand we can demonstrate empirically that this abstract recognition is withdrawn 
when it comes to concrete religious rights of Muslim minorities. 
This paper showcases the transformation of Germany into a country of immigration, 
presents figures and statistics on attitudes towards Muslims in Germany and showcases 
how narrative exclusion of Muslims from the collective German identity can lead to 
antidemocratic attitudes by denying this minority political participation. 
migration – Muslims – society – transformation – stereotypes – ambivalency – minority 
rights – democracy  
                                                             
1 In September 2000 the Independent Commission of Immigration officially declared that Germany is a 
country of immigration. This Commission was led by Rita Süssmuth (CDU) and the final report was 
presented to the Federal Minister of the Interior Otto Schilly (SPD) in July 2001. This report contained 
recommendation for future immigration policy and is seen as an official, legal and political recognition of 





1. Transformation of Germany into a country of immigration 
According to the latest press releases of the federal bureau of statistics in 2015 net 
immigration in Germany totalled 1,139,000 people (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016b). 
That is the largest number of immigrants to enter the country for the last 20 years, since 
the Asylum Compromise of 1993.The compromise placed tough restrictions on 
immigration, with the result that the immigration rate significantly decreased in 
subsequent years. In 2008 and 2009, Germany witnessed a negative migration net 
outcome, thus making Germany a de facto emigration country (Bundesamt für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016, 14). First the financial and then the euro crisis both led 
to increased numbers of immigrants entering Germany from 2010 onwards. At the same 
time, the German industry has publicly addressed the demographic change occurring in 
Germany and the country’s need for immigration. In 2015, 17,1 million people with a 
migration background lived in Germany, comprising 21% of the German population. Of 
these, the majority (9.3 million) held German citizenship, while 7.8 million were 
nationals of other countries (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016c). A quarter of people with 
a migration background are Muslim; of them, around half possess German citizenship. 
The majority of people with a migration background living in Germany stem from 
another European country; in the last five years, this portion of the population has 
grown significantly as a result of the financial and economic crises. In 2014, almost 
three quarters of all immigrants (73.8%) came to Germany from another European 
country (ibid., 15). Even in 2015 58% of the immigration influx to Germany was from 
within Europe (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016b).  
 
These numbers prove that Germany is a country of immigration that has been shaped by 
significant demographic changes as well as by increasing cultural, ethnic, religious, and 
national diversity. The meshing of people with and without migration background in the 
workplace, the family and in everyday life – which fosters the establishment of personal 
alliances: partnerships, marriages, daughters-in-law and sons-in-law, parents-in-law, 
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children and friends – leads to the fact that this migration background is a lived reality 
for more people than only the migrants themselves, and that the migrant experience 
therefore is relevant to more people (Foroutan et al. 2014, 38).  
Considering the 16 million people with a migration background in Germany, and taking 
into account the familial alliances formed by the members of this group with people 
who do not have a migration background themselves, we can say that about 35% of the 
total population is in some way affected by this “migration background” category, 
whereby it becomes increasingly difficult to use migration as the dividing line to 
distinguish between sections of society, as the migration experience is relevant to an 
ever growing portion of the population (ibid.). German society’s self-perception is 
increasingly moving beyond the migration aspect and on to negotiating social 
positioning, rights, and self-concepts in relation to equality of opportunity: Migration 
and immigration are politically recognized as constitutional elements of society, 
competing norms and values are being negotiated in a variety of ways, alliances are 
being developed based on attitudes to diversity, and boundaries against right-wing 
populist parties are formulated. At the same time, post-migrational societies are 
witnessing the growth of visibly antagonistic positions, and right-wing populist 
discourse with strong xenophobic and particularly anti-Muslim rhetoric is gaining an 
ever stronger foothold in mainstream society (Decker, Kiess and Brähler 2014).These 
ambivalences are affecting German society during its transformation from a country of 
immigration to a post-migrational society shaped by immigration and emigration flows, 
a society that increasingly recognizes its migration reality as fixed and is now ready to 
find a new self-description that moves beyond the migration aspect. 
For decades, from the first Labor Recruitment Treaty in 1955 up until the switch to a 
red-green government, the German government clung to the stance that Germany is not 
a country of immigration. However, since the early 2000s, official political documents 
have used the term “country of immigration” to describe Germany. The social sciences, 
seeking to underscore not only the political but also the social change that has resulted 
from this situation, also use the term “immigration society” (Bade 2013) or “migration 
society” (Broden and Mecheril 2007). 
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The numbers show that there have repeatedly been peaks and declines in the 
immigration flow to Germany over the last 25 years. If we examine the years 1991 and 
1992, we notice a very strong increase in immigration that stems from the fact that in 
1992, there was a migration surplus of about 800,000 people2 (Bundesamt für Migration 
und Flüchtlinge 2016, 14). Looking at the years 2008 and 2009, it is noticeable that 
Germany practically became a country of emigration, as the number of emigrants 
exceeded the number of immigrants by about 80,000 (ibid.). At the same time, the 
question of whether or not Germany is a country of immigration was a hotly debated 
topic during these years, even though it had been officially politically established in the 
documents of the Süssmuth Committee that Germany was indeed a country of 
immigration (Unabhängige Kommission „Zuwanderung“ 2001). 
While the numbers of immigrants barely changed through the official recognition, the 
narrative certainly did. The new narrative of Germany as a country of immigration was 
accompanied by many legal changes. The reformed German citizenship law replaced 
what was known as ius sanguinis, the blood-based law of nationality that had existed 
since 1913, which allowed only those who had German ancestors to become German 
citizens. With the reform of this law in 2001, it became possible to obtain German 
citizenship based on other criteria that did not include being of German descent. This is 
a massive change to the narrative of national identity and is in line with modern 
concepts of citizenship that allow someone to obtain a national identity document 
without having been born in the country or having ancestors from that country. 
Furthermore, Germany also passed the Immigration Law as well as laws enabling the 
recognition of international qualifications and dual citizenship. These changes were 
ushered in with the help of a new guiding principle – that of “Germany is a country of 
immigration”. 
The most recent statistics on immigration in Germany, for the year 2015, show that 
Germany had an extremely high net total of immigrants of 1,139,000 that year. After the 
mentioned significant emigration of 2008 and 2009, Germany experienced increased 
immigration once again after the financial crisis of 2008, caused mainly by immigration 
                                                             
2 These large numbers are linked to the violent break up of former Yugoslavia as well as the 
transformation processes in Eastern Europe which led to intensified migration movements in the 1990 
(Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2005). 
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from other EU countries. In 2014, 60% of newly arrived immigrants in Germany 
stemmed from other EU member states (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
2016, 15). Still in 2015 the majority of the immigrants where coming from the 
European Union (45%). If the 13% immigrants from other European countries further 
the EU are counted in, even in the big refugee year nearly 60% of the Immigrants came 
from Europe (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016b). 
What was the real impact of the increased immigration of 2014, which, compared to 
other years, was a significant hike in immigrant numbers, in terms of how it was 
managed by the Länder and how much it increased the population? The Länder such as 
Saarland, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thuringia experienced a decrease in their populations 
despite this rise in immigration to Germany; that among all the Länder, Berlin 
experienced the relatively greatest population increase, though still rather moderate at 
an increase of 1.4%; and that the next Länder with the highest rates of immigration, 
namely Hamburg, Hessen and Baden-Württemberg, experienced immigration rates of 
just under one percent. In light of the perceptions and the narrative of foreignization in 
Germany, it is important to put the population increase into perspective by pointing to 
this value of one percent.  
The Federal Statistical Office in Germany published its initial estimates for 2015 at the 
beginning of the year. Specifically, it published numbers based on what is known as the 
EASY Registration System, used to carry out initial registrations and pass the numbers 
on to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. These numbers pointed to an 
initial registration rate of almost 2 million, whereby it is to be expected that this number 
probably includes double and triple registrations of some of the same people. As a 
result, the estimates provided by the Federal Statistical Office state that, taking into 
consideration the number of people who left the country last year, the net immigration 
in Germany in 2015 numbered about 1.1 million (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016a). 
The net migration for 2015 exceeds the standing record total from the year 1992, when 
about 800,000 immigrants entered Germany. However, it is not an unusually high net 
migration, seeing as the numbers for 1992 were similar. In 1992, Germany was 
experiencing a much more difficult economic and structural situation than it is today, 
shaped by a phase of rising unemployment, the structural and emotional challenges of 
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reunification, and a time of intense social unrest throughout the country, especially later 
on in Rostock-Lichtenhagen, Solingen, Mölln3 as a result of increasing racism and 
xenophobia. 
I will conclude the empirical part of this article by asking how Germany has changed 
and is now represented in its diverse demographic structures. We know that we all have 
difficulty with the reciprocal practice of categorization. Who is German, who is still a 
migrant? A foreigner is someone who does not have a German passport – that is a 
relatively easily definable category. Yet we know that in our daily discourse 
conventions, “foreigner” can easily be used to describe someone who simply looks 
different, even if that person has had German passport for a long time or even always 
had one and never had held any other citizenship. For example, when we talk about 
pupils in Germany, we have what is known as the Option Regulation, we have dual 
citizenship. Pupils who start primary school in Germany hold German passports. There 
is a minimal last percentage category of pupils at Germany primary schools who do not 
hold German citizenship, i.e. the children of diplomats or stateless Palestinian children. 
Thus in essence, there are no longer any foreign children at German schools, so to 
speak. All of them have German passports. And yet it is still part of our daily speech, in 
our stories, even if it is well-intended, such as when a teacher says, “my German and 
my foreign children”. The realization that Germanness has very diverse elements has 
not yet become part of mainstream perception. 
2. Attitudes towards Muslims in Germany 
Since September 11th and the subsequent proclamation of the “War on Terrorism”, the 
image of Muslims as terrorists, archaic warriors or anachronistic religious believers has 
subsequently trickled out of international relations debates and entered the German 
national Diskurs-Raum (public debate). 
                                                             
3 In the 1990s racist-motivated acts of violence against asylum seekers and people with a migration 
background in general, increased strongly in Germany. Rostock-Lichtenhagen, Solingen and Mölln stand 
for fire strikes committed by neo-Nazis which caused many injured people and even deaths 




This was especially evident throughout the debate that was carried out in 2010/2011 by 
the Bundesbank's executive board member and former Berlin state finance minister 
Thilo Sarrazin. His controversial book Deutschland schafft sich ab ("Germany Does 
Away with Itself") concludes that Muslims are less intelligent because of their cultural 
ties, that they prefer to live off the state rather than work, and that they have too many 
children – while well-educated native Germans are having too few. Yet this book has 
sold more than one million copies, becoming the bestselling book in 2010. 
Common attributes and associations that are being linked with Muslims in Germany are 
“fanatic”, “backwards”, “intolerant”, or “undemocratic”, as a study by the German 
Institute for Human Rights found (Bielefeldt 2007, 4-5). The study also describes that 
21.4% of Germans think that “Muslim immigration to Germany should be stopped.” 
When asked whether “Muslim culture fits into our Western world “, three out of four 
respondents answered negatively (ibid). Islam and being Muslim are being perceived as 
something in stark contrast to being German. In the public eye, a five-year period of 
massive accusation after 9/11 had turned “the Muslims” into a group with low internal 
group differentiation and largely a security issue. Moreover, it led to remarkable 
alienation and estrangement between the constructed Muslim community and the 
majority non-Muslim society. 
A recent study conducted by the SPD-linked Friedrich Ebert Foundation entitled 
“Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European Report“ analyzed anti-
democratic attitudes in eight European countries. From a comparative perspective it 
found that “Europeans are largely united in their rejection of Muslims and Islam. The 
significantly most widespread anti-Muslim attitudes are found in Germany, Hungary, 
Italy and Poland, closely followed by France, Great Britain and the Netherlands” (Zick, 
Küpper and Hövermann 2012, 63). Almost half of all Germans said that there are too 
many Muslims living in the country – even though they make up only 5% of the 
population –, that they are too demanding, and that their religion is intolerant (ibid., 61). 
A long-term study conducted by the University of Münster investigating the “Perception 
and Acceptance of Religious Diversity” in a comparative analysis found that Germany 
has a worse relationship to non-Christian religions when compared to other European 
countries like Denmark, France, the Netherlands or Portugal. When asked: “How is 
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your personal attitude towards the members of the following religious groups?”, 62.2% 
of surveyed Germans living in the former East German Länder and 57.7% living in the 
former West German states answered “negative” or “extremely negative” concerning 
Islam (Denmark 35.6%, France 36.7%, the Netherlands 35.9%, Portugal 33.5%) 
(Pollack 2010, 5). Germans also answered significantly more negative than the 
compared countries when asked about Hinduism, Buddhism or Judaism. When the same 
study referred to positive attributions, nearly one third of the Dutch (32.6%) associated 
Islam with peace and 44.9% with solidarity, while in Germany positive attributions of 
peace and solidarity towards Islam were only given by 6.6% (former East German 
states) and 8.1% (former West German states) of the German population (Danish 
(25.9%/ 37.6%), French (13.6%/ 31.9%), Portuguese (19.8%/ 27.4%) (ibid., 6). 
These biased attitudes are sometimes expressed violently or aggressively: There have 
been several attacks on mosques, people perceived to be Arab or Muslim have been 
threatened, organizations receive daily hate mails and anti-Muslim internet blogs have 
received growing attention (Shooman 2014). 
Moreover, on a socio-economic level, people with a Muslim migration background are 
less likely to be hired or even invited to a job interview when their name doesn't sound 
“German” enough (SVR 2014), they have a harder time finding an apartment for the 
same reasons, and children with a “migration background” are less likely to receive a 
recommendation for continuing with higher education from teachers (Jürges and 
Schneider 2006). 
3. Narrative exclusion 
Having shown that anti-Muslim sentiments are being broadly examined and researched 
in Germany, I would like to showcase the outgrouping of Muslims from national 
identity with an empirical analysis conducted by our research team at the Berlin 
Institute for Integration and Migration Research (BIM). National identity serves as a 
cohesive trigger to construct an emotional “we”. Being placed outside this collective 
“we” can mean being placed outside rights to participate politically or socially, to 
represent one’s culture publicly, and even outside legitimate law. Being placed outside 
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the collective identity seems even to allow denying minorities (in this case Muslims), 
fundamental constitutional rights, which is a sign of anti-democratic attitudes.  
The empirical data presented here stem from a nationwide representative telephone 
survey (dual-frame RDD), with 8,270 German-speaking participants aged 16 and above, 
conducted between 24.09.2013 and 15.04.2014. In one survey experiment, respondents 
were presented with a variety of statements in which Muslims were compared with a 
collective “we” that respondents were able to define for themselves in a follow-up 
question. Two of these statements contained two stereotypes that corresponded to the 
core stereotypes related to violence and educational aspiration as established in the 
Sarrazin debate (“Muslims are more aggressive than we are”, “Muslim parents have the 
same educational aspirations as we do.”). The respondents were asked to state whether 
they agreed or disagreed with these statements. The follow-up question was, “And 
whom were you thinking of in terms of that ‘we’?”, and was asked openly. The 
experiment thereby fulfilled two purposes: On the one hand, the goal was to measure 
stereotypical attitudes towards Muslims, and on the other, we wanted to test a 
hypothesis previously established within the discursive space, namely one that states 
that Muslims are not included within the stated “we”, and therefore are not perceived as 
part of the German narrative. (Foroutan et al. 2014) 
3.1.  Stereotypical narrative of aggression and lack of educational 
aspirations 
From research on prejudices and stereotypes, we know that a so-called “outgroup” 
always has significance for the “ingroup” (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Brewer and Brown 
1998). The notions about Muslims that exist in Germany tell us something about the 
self-perception, fears, and projections of the non-Muslim population (Attia 2007). The 
references of postmigrant systems in regard to the national and cultural self-perception 
and perception of foreigners undergo changes over time, and the ideas ascribed to those 
who are perceived as “others” change along with them. Whereas the others were 
deemed unpunctual, dirty, and lazy – terms used to describe the guest workers in the 
1960s (Hunn 2005) – this mainly served to confirm a German identity, perceived via 
secondary virtues, and defined in terms of being punctual, clean, and hard-working. 
Today we describe German identity less via secondary virtues but rather in terms of its 
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embeddedness in a European context and described as democratic, tolerant, and 
enlightened, meaning that the other is described as anti-democratic, intolerant, and 
having yet to undergo the process of enlightenment. These ascriptions are often 
associated with Islam and consequently with Muslims (Weidner 2011). These 
exclusionary value discourses are flanked by stereotypical narratives that often re-
interpret and establish socialization factors as characteristics and mentalities and code 
them as fundamental aggressive tendencies or a genetic lack of educational aspiration, 
and then ascribe these characteristics to the culture, ethnicity, religion or nationality of 
the group in question. 
26.5% of survey respondents agreed with the statement “Muslims are more aggressive 
than we are,” while 64.2% disagreed with it (see Fig. 1). We see here that the majority 
of respondents positioned themselves in opposition to the stereotyping of Muslims in 
regard to aggressive potential. Nevertheless over a quarter of respondents assume that 
there is something unchangeably “Muslim”, namely a high degree of aggressive 
potential. 
 
Fig. 1: Exclusion from a national collective (Foroutan et al. 2014, 30) 
While most respondents (55.2%) agreed with the statement “Muslim parents have the 
same educational aspirations as we do”, still 30% of respondents disagreed, and 15% 
answered that they did not know (ibid.). We can conclude from this that little more than 
half of respondents assume that the topic of education finds equal resonance among 
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Muslim families as in their own. The responses to this statement reflect the strong 
perspective present among Germans that Muslim families are not as interested in 
education issues as non-Muslims are. However, over the last few years, it has repeatedly 
been empirically proven that the educational aspirations particularly of Muslim parents 
in Germany are very high, which coincides with the results of sociological research 
regarding immigrants’ desire for upward mobility.  
What stands out in the survey results is that despite the positive response behavior that 
occurred for both statements, over a quarter of the population took a rather ostracizing 
or marginalizing stance towards Muslims. While the unchallenged juxtaposition of the 
ingroup and “the” Muslims is implied within the questions (“Muslims are more 
aggressive than we are”), most respondents did not question this juxtaposition at all. 
Only 74 respondents out of the total of 8,215 explicitly criticized the question format. 
This demonstrates how firmly entrenched the placement of Muslims outside the 
narrative collective is. 
The us-them dichotomy sketched above represents an experimental part of the research 
question, as respondents were subsequently given the opportunity to further explain 
their concept of the “we” mentioned in the statements, by being asked by the 
interviewers: Who did you actually have in mind when using the word “we“? 
As this question was designed for open, freely formulated answers, a broad spectrum of 
responses was collected and subsequently coded and categorized to derive statistical 
data: 37.6% of respondents defined the ingroup that they juxtaposed with the Muslims 
as the ethnic or national category “German” in at least one instance. This includes 
answers such as “we Germans”, “the German population”, or “Germany” (ibid., 32). 
Such answers can be seen as markers of narrative exclusion, as they imply that 
“German” and “Muslim” are mutually exclusive categories – as if there were no 
German Muslims and no Muslim Germans. In fact, 45% of the four million Muslims 
living in Germany are German citizens (Haug, Müssig and Stichs 2009, 80). 
People could have answered differently. For example, they could have said: “By saying 
‘Muslims are more aggressive than we’ are, I meant more aggressive than us, the 
Christians.” Or they could have said: “I meant us, the non-Muslims.” Such terms 
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would be logical complementary categories to “Muslim”, but they were used by only 
5.8% of respondents in at least one instance (Foroutan et al. 2014, 32).  
Here again we note the significance of national or ethnic identity that many respondents 
perceive as being the opposite of a religious category of “being Muslim”. This finding 
supports our observation that Muslims in Germany are excluded from the national 
narrative. However, it must be pointed out that these findings are based on a survey 
experiment and that it is not clear what respondents mean when they use national or 
ethnic categories in their answers. The majority of respondents did not use either of 
these categories (48.6%), and provided other factors such as family environment, 
society, friends, etc., as part of the narrative “we” that they juxtaposed with the term 
“Muslim”. 9.3% of the respondents would not or could not commit to a definition of the 
collective “we” and thereby pointed to a perspective that is skeptical of rigid and 
distinct identities. One of the respondents clearly expressed this contradiction: “That is 
precisely the problem: There’s no such thing as ‘the German’, ‘the Muslim’ or ‘the 
Turk’, that’s what is making this difficult for me.” (ibid.) 
3.2. The Ambivalences of being German 
Furthermore in our survey we asked respondents what being German means to them and 
which criteria are important to the population when it comes to being German. We 
noted that almost 100% of respondents answered, “Being able to speak German.” A 





Fig. 2: Conditions of belonging (Foroutan et al. 2014, 25-26) 
These are two very unequivocal items that form part of a modern citizenship law. It is 
recognized that it is possible to become German, and that this requires speaking the 
language and holding German citizenship. At the same time, respondents limited this 
possibility, with 40% noting, “It is not enough to be able to speak German; one must be 
able to speak it without an accent.” In reality, this probably does not refer to dialects, 
but rather the fact that even small errors in one’s spoken German allow listeners to 
determine that the speaker has not spent his or her entire life in Germany. Making tiny 
mistakes when it comes to articles allows one to hear that it is a difficult and 
complicated language that it is sometimes not possible to learn to perfection. 
What was of great interest to us when we posed the question about how to deal with 
minorities was the fact that about 40% of respondents said that being German required 
giving up wearing the headscarf (ibid.). This is an ambivalence that I have previously 
pointed out. On the one hand, there is obviously a high cognitive awareness of the fact 
that this country has changed, that citizenship has changed, that the country has become 
more diverse and that ever more people who did not or do not look a certain way and 
who do not have German-sounding names have become German. Despite this, it is not 
enough to be able to speak German and to hold German citizenship, if one wears a 
headscarf, then approximately 40% of the population believes that you cannot be 
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German. Another 37% are of the opinion that being German really does require having 
German ancestors (ibid.). 
3.3.  Acceptance of equal rights of minorities 
This outgrouping of Muslims from the collective society can also be observed in some 
controversial debates about the cultural, socio-spatial and symbolic recognition of 
religious diversity. Discussions about circumcision, mosque construction and the 
wearing of the headscarf, which we are using here to exemplify the topics of cultural, 
socio-spatial and symbolic recognition, have repeatedly shaped the political discourse 
over the last few years and illustrate the restrictions of religious rights with which 
Muslims are confronted in the German immigration society. How is the cultural, socio-
spatial, and symbolic recognition of Muslims by the population in Germany regarded? 
In our survey, we asked respondents about their attitude to political topics in relation to 
Muslims, in order to find out how the German population regards the constitutionally 
legitimized participation rights of Muslims. Three statements dealt with the cultural, 
socio-spatial and symbolic recognition of Muslims (“The circumcision of boys for 
religious reasons should be banned”; “A female Muslim teacher should have the right to 
wear a headscarf in the classroom”; “The construction of publicly visible mosques in 
Germany should be restricted”). 
We were able to determine that at an abstract level, recognition was very high, but at the 
concrete level, there was a lack of willingness to give recognition, participation or 
participatory rights. The non-Muslim population has an ambivalent attitude to Muslims 
as visible political actors: On the one hand, a decisive majority (67%) finds that 
Muslims in Germany have the right to make demands, and almost an equal number of 
respondents stated that Muslims deserve more recognition. However, 20% of the 
population is of the opinion that Muslims making demands is a sign of shamelessness, 







Fig. 3: Cognitive acceptance I (Foroutan et al. 2014, 34) 
The ambivalence is particularly expressed in attitudes towards topics of political 
discourse related to structural, socio-spatial, and symbolic recognition and 
participations. For example, 69% of the population is in favor of Islamic religious 
instruction in schools, but at the same time, 60% of respondents want to ban the 
religion-based circumcision of boys. Meanwhile, almost half of all Germans (49%) 
believe that female Muslim teachers should not be allowed to wear headscarves in class, 




Fig. 4: Cognitive acceptance II (Foroutan et al. 2014, 34-35) 
There seems to be an obvious lack of awareness of that which is fixed as a fundamental 
right as Article 4 in the constitution, namely religious freedom, the freedom to practice 
one’s religion and the right to build places of worship, and the right not to be impeded 
in the practicing of one’s religion. At the same time, we can observe – the debate is 
once again highly topical, in December 2015 throughout the Christmas season it was 
very active – that there is a great deal of agreement within the population in regard to 
passing a law that stipulates immigrants’ obligation to  ostensibly German 
fundamental values. A large portion of the population is of the opinion that such a law 
should be introduced. But the question is whether we can really achieve progress if we 
regard integration merely as an obligation on the part of minorities while neglecting to 
ask what role the majority society should play in the integration process. The debate 
about the questions of the minority’s obligation to integrate revolves around core beliefs 
related to homosexuality and gender equality. The question that all could ponder 
together is whether it would be sensible, instead of a one-way obligation to integrate, to 
think about a collective integration contract that every one of the society signs. Because 
the question is, in fact, whether there are certain core points that we have established 




German citizens have a positive image of Germany and they identify themselves 
strongly with their country but as latest empirical data shows Muslims are not perceived 
as parts of the national narrative. 
Excluding attitudes towards Muslims are accompanied by stereotypes. 27% of the 
respondents perceive Muslims to be more aggressive than “their own group” and 30% 
think that Muslims’ educational aspirations are lower than “their own group”. When 
asked for a definition of this "own- group”, nearly 40% of the respondents use an 
ethnical or national category like “we Germans”, “the German population” or “the 
German society”. Being Muslim and being German are perceived as two opposite 
categories. In this regard Muslims are defined outside of the “German we”. 
The citizens of Germany have an ambivalent position towards Muslims as visible 
political agents. On a more abstract level, German society is willing to accept the 
participation rights of Muslims, but on more concrete levels, crucial rights are refused: 
A majority of the population (67%) accepts the right of Muslims to claim rights in 
Germany, but simultaneously 60% of the respondents refuse to accept the ritual of 
circumcision for boys. Nearly every second respondent (48%) supports the statement 
that female teachers should not wear a headscarf, and 42% would support a legal 
restriction on the construction of mosques. Only Islamic religious instruction in schools 
is accepted by most of the citizens (69%).  
The first analysis illustrates that citizens with a strong affiliation with German identity, 
i.e. people who emphasize the importance of being seen as German, are more likely to 
deny cultural-religious, social-spatial and symbolic rights (ibid., 36). Accordingly, 68% 
of this group are against the ritual of circumcision for boys. 56% support the statement 
that female teachers should not wear a headscarf, and 55% would support a restriction 
on the construction of mosques. On the other hand, people with a lower level of national 
attachment are more likely to include Muslims. 54% of this group are against the ritual 
of circumcision for boys, 43% support the statement that female teachers should not 
wear a headscarf, and 35% would support a restriction on constructing mosques.  
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We can summarize by saying that the willingness to exclude Muslims from the 
collective German narrative refers not only to discursive, identity, and emotional 
positions, but to the fundamental question of accepting democratic rights of minorities: 
practicing one’s religion and constructing places of worship are –with specific 
restrictions – fundamental civil rights. Negative attitudes do not necessarily lead to 
action, but if we witness 75 attacks on mosques and 1031 attacks on refugees and their 
shelters during the last year (Meisner, Tretbar and Keilholz 2016), that must be seen not 
only as clear criminal acts but also as a lack of basic knowledge about democracy . 
Heterogeneous societies shaped by migration discourses must therefore more 
thoroughly educate their populations about democratic principles if they want right 
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